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Abstract
This article explores civil society organisations’ (CSOs) participation in judicial review proceedings. This
became contentious when the Ministry of Justice announced that it intended to reform the judicial review
process, and suggested changes to the law on standing and third-party interventions. Ultimately, the
Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 did not amend the law in these areas, but has arguably made it
more difficult for CSOs to engage in public interest litigation. Attempts to restrict the access of CSOs
to judicial review need to be seen in the context of the shifting relationship between CSOs and the
state, and differing perspectives on their function. If CSOs are to continue to take part in judicial review
cases they need to justify their presence in terms of their expertise and on the ground knowledge. It is
argued that deliberative, dignitarian and more general theories about the nature of civil society may
well establish a basis for CSOs’ continued presence in judicial review litigation.
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Introduction
The legal climate is becoming increasingly chilly towards public interest litigation (PIL). The gaps in
legal services consequent upon the reductions in legal aid and the changes to the judicial review
procedure, made by the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, make it more difficult to conduct
PIL. Those sceptical of the value of PIL characterise it as a form of political lobbying inappropriate
in the courtroom. By contrast, civil society organisations (CSOs) value the chance to be part of the
judicial review process.1 This is apparent from CSOs’ resistance to suggestions in the Ministry of
Justice’s consultation paper Judicial Review: Proposals for Further Reform (Proposals for Further
Reform) that the rules on standing and third-party interventions be tightened, thus making judicial
review less accessible.2
CSOs, alongside the legal profession and judges, cite the key components of the rule of law (namely
accountability and legality) as justification for CSOs’ involvement in judicial review. It is axiomatic that
a sound legal claim is integral to any successful litigation. Another importunate argument, and the one
© The Society of Legal Scholars 2018. This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the
original work is properly cited.
1Groups involved in PIL can be classified, and referred to variously. The term civil society organisation is used rather than
pressure or interest group, third sector, non-government organisations (NGOs) or social movement. CSO is the term used
since 2010 by government. See Cabinet Office The Compact: The Coalition Government and Civil Society Organisations
Working Effectively in Partnership for the Benefit of Communities and Citizens in England (Cabinet Office, 2010) p 6 (here-
after The Compact 2010). CSOs are characterised as being not for profit, self-governing, independent of government and
acting for a public benefit. See J Kendall ‘The UK ingredients in a hyperactive policy environment’ in J Kendall (ed)
Handbook on Third Sector Policy in Europe: Multi-Level Processes and Organised Civil Society (Cheltenham: Edward
Elgar, 2009) p 72. See also J Kendall and M Knapp ‘A loose and baggy monster: boundaries, definition and typologies’ in
J Davis Smith, C Rochester and R Hedley (eds) An Introduction to the Voluntary Sector (London: Routledge, 1995) p 65.
2Ministry of Justice Judicial Review: Proposals for Further Reform Cm 8703 (London: TSO, 2013).
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focused on here, is that CSOs’ presence in judicial review proceedings provides an opportunity for
their participation and for holding government to account. CSOs are a counterbalance to the
power of the state and act as a voice for those whose interest might otherwise be sidelined.
CSOs have perceived government initiatives to limit their access to judicial review proceedings as
part of a pattern of law and policies that inhibit their advocacy work. A report commissioned by
the National Council for Voluntary Organisations (NCVO), an umbrella body representing many
mainstream CSOs, stated that:
When we heard that Iain Duncan Smith had attacked the Child Poverty Action Group (CPAG) in
2011 we thought it might have been an aberration. He said that the CPAG’s legal challenge to
housing benefit reforms was ‘ridiculous … irresponsible behaviour’ and said it was a ‘massive
waste of taxpayers’money and court time’.3 Since then Ministers have started to reduce the ability
of the voluntary sector to turn to the courts in various ways.4
CSOs were perturbed by these and similar comments. What was expressed was not a riposte to the
CSOs’ allegations of abuse of power. Rather it was a denial of the legitimacy of the CSO’s attempt
to challenge the government in the courts. This is troubling for CSOs, who facilitate both political
and legal accountability by feeding through information, offering insights from their work and
mobilising those affected by law and policy.
Many CSOs see themselves as having a responsibility to assist those who lack sufficient knowledge
and funds to identify and pursue abuses of power. The number of judicial review claims brought by
CSOs is relatively small, but they have been involved in some significant legal challenges to govern-
ment policies, either as claimants or interveners.5 This is particularly true of CSOs who provide
services in areas such as welfare, housing, immigration, prisoners’ rights and community care.
CSOs mostly use political avenues to advance their agendas by joining debates on policy, working
with civil servants, parliamentary bodies and other political mechanisms.6 CSOs may also engage
with law to prevent executive excess or where courts are making significant interpretations or devel-
oping the law in areas within their remit. They facilitate legal accountability, which includes not only
the protection of rights and challenging the abuse of power, but also participation and the communi-
cation of values and principles.7 The Supreme Court, albeit it in different circumstances, has
recently reiterated the importance of access to the courts; one reason given was that judicial decisions
often determine issues of general public importance, and are not just of value to the parties to
the case.8
This paper examines the impact that the changing relationship between the state and civil society
has had on the dispute over PIL. The first part discusses the background to the current debate on PIL
and the scope of judicial review. The second part looks more closely at the reasons given by CSOs for
wanting to take part in judicial review claims, as put forward in their responses to the Proposals for
Further Reform consultation and other CSO’ produced materials. The third part of the paper reflects
on the justification for access to the courts demanded by civil society. It contributes to the existing
scholarship by analysing how measures taken to constrain CSO activities in the political realm have
led to a questioning of their advocacy and participation in judicial review cases. It also adds to the
3R Ramesh ‘Iain Duncan Smith accused of “losing his cool” in housing benefit outburst’ (The Guardian, 14 October 2011).
4The Panel on the Independence of the Voluntary Sector Independence Undervalued: The Voluntary Sector in 2014, The
Panel’s Third Annual Assessment (London: The Baring Foundation, 2014) p 27.
5See n 25 below.
6For a discussion of different forms of accountability see D Oliver Constitutional Reform in the UK (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2003) p 56.
7J King ‘The instrumental value of legal accountability’ in N Bamforth and P Leyland (eds) Accountability in the
Contemporary Constitution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) p 125.
8R (on the application of Unison) v Lord Chancellor [2015] UKSC 51 at para 69.
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debate on PIL by taking a fresh look at deliberative and dignitarian justifications for PIL. It builds a
stronger conceptual framework by situating them within notions of civil society that regard the auton-
omy and distinctiveness of CSOs as imperative in enabling them to speak truth to power. It maintains
that unless CSOs retain their independence, and make the normative case for PIL, there is the real
possibility that this option will be removed by stealth, and legal accountability will be permanently
weakened.
This discussion of PIL is not intended as a ‘call to arms’ to CSOs to make claims or to intervene in
judicial review cases. There are difficult strategic decisions to be made in terms of costs, unwanted
publicity, and decisions that may provide unhelpful precedents for the future.9 The limitations of
PIL are well known and have been examined across various disciplines.10 They include doubts
about the effectiveness of PIL in bringing about long-term social change.11 There is also the possibility
that only those groups who are well funded and regularly participate in legal processes as ‘repeat
players’ are likely to be successful, thus reinforcing existing hierarchies.12 Other misgivings are that
it distracts from political activities, undermines the neutrality of the judiciary and requires the court
to make polycentric decisions better made elsewhere.13 The more practical limitations of PIL include
costs, bad publicity and obtaining a pyrrhic victory that will be quickly overturned by a public author-
ity or by legislation.14 Recently the Charity Commission has issued guidelines on litigation warning of
the need to carefully balance risks when bringing test cases.15 These dilemmas are not new, and are
matters for a CSO to weigh up when it decides whether or not it wants to become involved in legal
proceedings.
Access to the courts is of critical importance to CSOs, despite the risks, and alternative sources of
finance, such as crowdsourcing, are being used to overcome funding difficulties.16 There is also
ongoing research into the effective use of law in the work of the voluntary sector.17 The fire in a
tower block in London, owned by a local authority, killing 71 residents in June 2017, drew attention
to the difficulties of ordinary citizens in challenging public authorities. The Grenfell Tower
Association claimed they were unable to obtain legal advice to explore legal remedies over safety issues,
before the fire.18 At the same time, the constitution is being re-shaped as the UK leaves the EU and
there is uncertainty about the future of the Human Rights Act (HRA). The litigation in R (on the
application of Miller) v Secretary of State for the European Union has drawn attention to the power
of the courts on judicial review.19 In this atmosphere, it is likely that the role of PIL in the constitution
is going to remain controversial. This is significant for organisations engaging in PIL and it is import-
ant that the issues surrounding their presence are fully explored.
9See further J Leslie and M Spurrier ‘A best practice guide to strategic litigation – part 1’ (2013) November LAG 7; J Leslie
and M Spurrier ‘A best practice guide to strategic litigation – part 2’ (2014) May LAG 3.
10See C Hilson ‘The courts and social movements: two literatures and two methodologies, mobilising ideas’ 18 February
2013, available at https://mobilizingideas.wordpress.com/2013/02/18/the-courts-and-social-movements-two-literatures-and-
two-methodologies/ (last accessed 12 July 2018).
11GN Rosenberg The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change? (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).
See contra M McCann Rights at Work: Pay Equity Reform and the Politics of Legal Mobilisation (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1994) and D Schultz Leveraging the Law: Using the Courts to Achieve Social Change (New York: Peter
Lang, 1998).
12MGalantar ‘Why the “haves” come out ahead: speculation on the limits of legal change’ (1974) Law and Society Review 95.
13C Harlow and R Rawlings Pressure through Law (London: Routledge, 1992).
14Leslie and Spurrier, above n 9.
15The Charity Commission Charities and Litigation: The Legal Underpinnings August 2016.
16See Crowdjustice, available at https://www.crowdjustice.co.uk/cases/ (last accessed 12 June 2018). See P McCurry
‘Crowdfunding catches on to judicial reviews’ (2016) Nov/Dec Third Sector 63.
17Baring Foundation and the Legal Education Foundation Programme on Strengthening the Voluntary Sector, https://baring
foundation.org.uk/programme/strengthening-the-voluntary-sector-programme/ (last accessed 12 June 2018).
18O Bowcott ‘Legal aid cuts “may have stopped Grenfell tenants pursuing safety concerns”’ (The Guardian, 29 June 2017).
19[2017] UKSC 5.
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Civil society organisations and public interest litigation: when opportunity knocks
PIL refers to the activity of using litigation to obtain wider collective objectives that go beyond the
interest of the parties to the case.20 Bringing test cases, challenging the decisions of public authorities
and third-party interventions are the most common forms of PIL. PIL can involve a group bringing a
case in their own name or seeking out and/or supporting those who want to litigate in cases that have a
broader impact. Some definitions of PIL require that the activities directly relate to advancing the
causes of minority groups.21 Generally, it will involve a group asking the court to reconsider a past
decision, decide an issue that will affect a large group or particular class of people, or consider a
new legal point or perspective. PIL takes many forms and extends across different areas of law,
with employment and tort law being popular sites of PIL. The focus here is on judicial review because
it is the most regularly used forum for challenging public authorities, and the legitimacy of this activity
has been called into question.
There is a long-standing tradition of PIL in the UK and within judicial review proceedings.22 It was,
therefore, to be expected that aspects of the legislation and policy implementing the austerity agenda
and the subsequent cuts in public expenditure, introduced by the Coalition Government (2010–2015),
to address the deficit, would be tested in the courts.23 Consequently, CSOs were involved in challenges
to key elements of government policies.24 For example, the implementation of two of the Coalition’s
most controversial and highly-publicised welfare law changes were the subject of Supreme Court deci-
sions. Both CPAG and Shelter intervened in the ‘benefits cap’ case and CPAG acted for the claimants
challenging the imposition of the ‘bedroom tax’ in the case of a family with a disabled child.25
The Coalition Government expressed disquiet about PIL and proposed reducing the opportunities
that CSOs had to engage in judicial review. This was commensurate with the antipathy some ministers
had expressed for PIL, and especially the litigation generated by the HRA.26 The ability to engage in
PIL is determined by the existence of legal opportunity structures. As Hilson explains, this includes
wide rules of standing, rules limiting costs and the availability of in-house lawyers, whilst legal oppor-
tunities include judicial receptiveness and actor agency in making use of possibilities.27
The Proposals for Further Reform consultation in 2013 stated that judicial review should be
reformed to address the ‘impact of judicial review on economic recovery and growth’ and ‘the inappro-
priate use of judicial review as a campaign tactic’.28 It asserted that there was a need to deal with ‘the
delays and costs associated with judicial review that delayed executive action’.29 The consultation pro-
posed a number of changes, but the most far reaching were to narrow the rules on standing and to
20Harlow and Rawlings, above n 13, p 1.
21J Cooper and R Dhavan Public Interest Law (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987) p 5 and T Prosser Test Cases for the Poor:
Legal Techniques in the Politics of Social Welfare (London: Child Poverty Action Group, 1983).
22Harlow and Rawlings, above n 13, p 291.
23See further HM Treasury Spending Review 2010 Cm 7942 (London: TSO, 2010).
24T Dyke ‘Judicial review in an age of austerity’ (2011) JR 202 and L Busch ‘Austerity and equality’ (2013) JR 6.
25R (on the application of SG and Others) (previously JS and Others) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2015]
UKSC 16 and R (Rutherford and Todd) v SSWP [2016] UKSC 58. Other examples include R (on the application of the
Rights of Women) v Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice [2016] EWCA Civ 91 and R (on the application of
McDonald) v Kensington and Chelsea RLBC (Age UK Intervening) [2011] UKSC 33.
26See above n 4 and see further P Munce ‘The conservative party and constitutional reform: revisiting the conservative
dilemma through Cameron’s bill of rights’ (2014) Parliamentary Affairs 80.
27C Hilson ‘New social movements: the role of legal opportunity’ (2002) Journal of European Public Policy 238. See further
L Hodson NGOs and the Struggle for Human Rights in Europe (London: Hart, 2010); L Vanhala Making Rights a Reality?
Disability Rights Activists and Legal Mobilization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). From a US perspective
see E Andersen Out of the Closet and into the Courts, Legal Opportunity Structure and Gay Rights Litigation (Michigan:
University of Michigan Press, 2005).
28Proposals for Further Reform, above n 2, paras 7–9. See also Ministry of Justice Judicial Review: Proposals for Reform Cm
8515 (London: TSO, 2012). See the Civil Procedure (Amendment Rules No 4) Rules 2013. See further V Bondy and M
Sunkin ‘Judicial review reform: who is afraid of judicial review: debunking the myth of growth and abuse’ UK
Constitutional Law Blog (10 January 2013), available at http://ukconstitutionallaw.org (last accessed 13 June 2018).
29Proposals for Further Reform, above n 2, para 7.
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restrict third-party interventions.30 With regard to standing, its concern was that the ‘sufficient interest
test’ was too broad.31 It stated that the executive and Parliament’s right to determine the public interest
was being challenged, efficient decision making was hindered and cases were being brought by CSOs
and others to obtain publicity.32 To rectify this, the Government suggested narrowing the rules to
‘exclude persons who had only a political or theoretical interest, such as campaigning groups’.33
The consultation acknowledged that third-party interventions might be helpful, but that they can
also over-complicate proceedings.34 For CSOs third-party interventions have been an especially useful
method of participation in HRA cases where standing is restricted by the ‘victim’ test, which precludes
them bringing direct claims in the public interest.35 The former Minister for Justice put his reasons for
making these changes rather more colourfully in an article in the Daily Mail. He complained that ‘…
pressure groups were wasting taxpayers’ money and damaging economic progress’ by bringing cases
that caused delay to government projects. He concluded that judicial review should not be there as
‘a promotional tool for countless left-wing campaigners’.36
Ultimately, the Government decided against changing the law on standing and third-party inter-
ventions.37 Instead the law has made it more financially risky for CSOs to bring judicial review
claims.38 The Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 has put the rules on cost capping orders into
statutory form and has made them, along with legal aid, unavailable until after the permission
stage.39 It has put third-party intervenors at risk of having to pay costs and has made it easier for
the court to refuse a remedy to a successful claimant.40 It has demanded that claimants make
known those who help to fund a claim, and has exposed those who may financially support a judicial
review to the possibility of paying costs.41 The cuts in the availability of legal aid made in the Legal Aid
Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 also mean there are reduced funds available. These
changes are still bedding down and there is limited evidence available on their impact.42 But there is
increasing concern about the unaffordability and inaccessibility of judicial review.43 CSOs continue to
30Environmental law and planning cases raise specialist issues in relation to the application of the Aarhus Convention,
United Nations Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in
Environmental Matters (Aarhus, 25 June 1998). These matters are not dealt with in any depth here.
31See the Senior Courts Act 1981, s 31(3) and R v National Revenue Commissioners, ex p National Federation of Self
Employed and Small Businesses Ltd [1982] AC 617.
32Proposals for Further Reform, above n 2, para 79. For cases where CSOs have been granted standing see R v Inspectorate
of Pollution, ex p Greenpeace Ltd (No 2) [1994] 4 All ER 329 and R v Secretary of State for Social Services, ex p Child Poverty
Action Group [1990] 2 QB 540. Where a CSO was refused standing see R v Secretary of State for the Environment, ex p Rose
Theatre Trust Co [1990] 1 QB 504. On standing generally see AXA General Insurance Ltd and Others v Lord Advocate and
Others [2011] UKSC 46. See further P Cane ‘Standing up for the public’ (1995) PL 277 and Proposals for Further Reform,
above n 2, para 68.
33Proposals for Further Reform, above n 2, para 80.
34Proposals for Further Reform, above n 2, para 90.
35HRA 1998, s 7.
36C Grayling ‘The judicial review system is not a promotional tool for countless left wing campaigners’ (Daily Mail, 11
September 2013).
37Ministry of Justice Judicial Review-Proposals for Further Reform: The Government Response Cm 8811 (London: TSO,
2014) p 11.
38Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, ss 84–90. For an overview see Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law, Public Law
Project and Justice Judicial Review and the Rule of Law: An Introduction to the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, Part 4
(London: Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law, Justice and the Public Law Project, 2015), available at http://www.biicl.org/
documents/767_judicial_review_and_the_rule_of_law_-_final_for_web_19_oct_2015.pdf?showdocument=1 (last accessed
13 June 2018).
39Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, ss 84–90; Civil Procedure (Amendment No 2) Rules 2016, SI 2016/707 and Civil
Legal Aid (Remuneration) (Amendment) (No 3) Regulations 2014, SI 2014/607.
40Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, s 87 and s 54.
41Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, ss 85–86.
42See further A Wallace ‘No substantial difference test’ (2017) JR 269.
43T Hickman ‘Public law’s disgrace’ UK Constitutional Law Blog (9 February 2017), available at https://ukconstitutionallaw.org
(last accessed 12 July 2018). See also the concerns expressed by Civil Exchange on changes to the costs rules for environmental
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worry that advocacy work is being discouraged, and fear that there is a deliberate attempt to steer them
from away from using the courts.44
Overall, the de facto impact of these changes to judicial review are to reduce the legal opportunity
structures for PIL. The connection made by the government between PIL and the work of CSOs is
revelatory and epitomises the tension between them. CSOs see exiling them from the judicial review
process as an attempt to clip their wings and inhibit their advocacy work, thus raising issues about
their participation in court proceedings. The danger is that changes initiated to inhibit opposition
to government decision-making, through the courts, may lead to a longer term weakening of CSOs’
capacity to advocate for their clients and hold government to account.
Shifting boundaries: CSOs and the state
CSOs have established a place within the litigation process encouraged by favourable legal opportun-
ities and broader contemporary norms that have endorsed their contribution to the legal discourse.
The judiciary’s response to the Proposals for Further Reform consultation was broadly supportive of
the current rules on standing and third-party interventions, noting that there was no observable prob-
lem with judicial review being misused for campaigning.45 The government consultation also observed
that the cases identified as being lodged by CSOs ‘tended to be relatively successful compared to other
JR hearings’.46 In addition, Bondy, Platt and Sunkin’s research sample found only 3% of judicial
reviews were brought directly by interest groups.47 This suggests that CSOs have used the courts
sparingly, but where they have engaged in court-based litigation, it has usually had a credible legal
foundation. With this in mind it is suggested that the government’s unease towards PIL is symptom-
atic of the shift in the relationship between CSOs and the state that took place after 2010. It is this
rather than any misuse of judicial review by CSOs that has driven the modifications. It is instructive
to reflect on the government’s changing expectations and its underlying philosophy towards CSOs, as
well as the shifts in the policy environment brought about by the austerity agenda. Understanding this
background allows for a more discerning appraisal of the legitimacy of CSOs’ involvement in judicial
review cases.
The creation of the Coalition Government in 2010 prompted a resetting of the relationship between
government and CSOs. This is not unusual, as most governments have reconfigured their relations
with civil society to fit their own agendas.48 In an oft-cited quote, civil society has been defined as
‘the space of un-coerced human association and also the set of relational networks formed for the
sake of family, faith, interest and ideology that fill this space’.49 It is an understatement to note that
there are a myriad of versions and political traditions that accompany the concept of civil society.50
One vision of civil society sees the public sphere and civil society as a site of rational deliberation,
where real life experiences connect with political forces and institutions providing for participation
law cases: Civil Exchange A Shared Society? The Independence of the Voluntary Sector in 2017 (London: Civil Exchange and
the Baring Foundation, 2017) p 46.
44Civil Exchange 2017, ibid, p 14.
45Judiciary of England and Wales Response of the Senior Judiciary to the Ministry of Justice’s Consultation Entitled ‘Judicial
Review: Proposals for Further Reform’ (1 November 2013) para 19. See also Lady Hale’s positive comments on the role of
CSOs: B Hale ‘Who guards the guardians?’ (2014) Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law 100 at 104–105.
46Proposals for Further Reform, above n 2, para 78.
47CSOs may also support claims by individual claimants that have a wider public interest. These cases are harder to quan-
tify, but the authors conclude that the relatively small number of such cases did not indicate abuse of the system: V Bondy, L
Platt and M Sunkin The Value and Effects of Judicial Review: The Nature of Claims, their Outcomes and Consequences
(London: Public Law Project, 2015) pp 18 and 34.
48J Kendall and M Knapp The Voluntary Sector in the UK (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1006) p 21.
49MWalzer ‘The concept of civil society’ in MWalzer (ed) Toward a Global Civil Society (Oxford: Berhahn Books, 2002) p 7.
50M Edwards Civil Society (Cambridge: Polity, 3rd edn, 2014) p 9.
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and debate and a place where new ideas are nurtured.51 New Labour’s policy elicited some of these
themes, drawing CSO’s into a partnership as part of a third sector that saw CSOs as ‘… neither
part of the state nor the private profit-making sector and thus well placed to develop policy and pro-
vide services as part of a “third way” politics’.52 This was supported by the injection of resources and
creation of institutions.53 It was formalised by a series of concordats referred to as Compacts, which set
down, in some detail, the relationship between civil society and government.54
During the subsequent period of the Coalition Government the partnership between government
and CSOs continued, but was characterised by increased tensions that seeped into the debate on judi-
cial review. There was a philosophical difference with the previous era. The Conservatives perceived
CSO activities in terms of more local or geographical community groups or Burkean ‘little platoons’
in line with the ‘Big Society agenda’.55 This was consistent with the traditional neo-Tocquevellian ideas
of civil society that stress self-reliance, inculcation of societal values and the benefits of an active citi-
zenry solving problems for themselves with minimal state intervention.56 Groups that went beyond
service provision and had their own agendas, pursued through political and legal forums, did not
fit neatly into the Big Society frame and were seen as straying outside of a more traditional remit.57
Such groups, including Shelter, CPAG and Age UK are the type of organisations likely to be engaged
in PIL. The Big Society accentuated a commitment to, inter alia, volunteering and encouraging
community organising. The Big Society concept did not capture the public imagination to the extent
hoped, but much of this ideology still guides the Conservative government’s policy towards the
voluntary sector.58
Significantly, the different philosophy of the post-2010 government manifested itself in a series of
public disputes where the legitimacy of voice and advocacy role of the sector was questioned. This was
particularly noticeable where there was dissent towards aspects of the austerity policy. The Save the
Children and Oxfam campaigns on child poverty, and the public comments of the Trussel Trust
which runs food banks were accused of being overtly political, and representing the views of the
staff and not the beneficiaries of the charity.59 In addition, during the 2015 and 2017 General
Elections and the EU referendum campaign in 2016, it was reported that CSOs were inhibited
from participating in debates on policy issues such as social care.60 There was a fear of transgressing
the controversial Transparency of Lobbying, Non Party Campaigning and Trade Union
51J Habermas Between Facts and Norms (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992) and JL Cohen and A Arato Civil Society and
Political Theory (New Baskerville: MIT Press, 1992). For a more sceptical view of civil society see J Ehrenberg Civil
Society: The Critical History of an Idea (New York: New York University Press, 1999).
52P Alcock ‘Voluntary action, new labour and the “third sector”’ in M Hilton and J Mckay (eds) The Ages of Voluntarism:
How We Got to the Big Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the British Academy, 2011) p 164.
53Ibid, p 166.
54Home Office The Compact on Relations between the Government and the Voluntary Sector in England Cm 4100 (London:
Home Office, 1998). The Compact was redrafted in 2009. See Cabinet Office The Compact on Relations between Government
and the Third Sector in England (London: Cabinet Office, 2009). For the most recent version see The Compact 2010, above n
1. For a critical analysis see C Rochester Rediscovering Voluntary Action (London: Palgrave MacMillan 2013) especially ch 5
and pp 73–84. The Compact is not legally enforceable, but it has been referred to as a model of good practice in various
judgments. See R (on the application of Rotao Rahman) v Birmingham City Council [2011] EWHC 944 (Admin).
55M Hilton et al The Politics of Expertise: How NGOs Shaped Modern Britain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013)
p 269.
56Edwards, above n 50.
57Hilton et al, above n 55, p 265.
58T May ‘The shared society: Prime Minister’s speech to the Charity Commission annual meeting’, 19 January 2017, available at
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-shared-society-prime-ministers-speech-at-the-charity-commission-annual-meeting
(last accessed 13 June 2018).
59N Lamb ‘Is charity campaigning under threat from the coalition government?’ (2014) Voluntary Sector Review 125. The
Panel on the Independence of the Voluntary Sector An Independent Mission: The Voluntary Sector in 2015: The Panel’s
Fourth and Final Annual Assessment (London: The Baring Foundation, 2015) pp 37–41.
60A Asthana ‘Charities scared to speak out during election campaign’ (The Guardian, 31 May 2017).
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Administration Act 2014 (the Lobbying Act).61 The National Council of Voluntary Organisations has
documented the anxiety about the attempts to discourage the advocacy work of CSOs and undermine
their autonomy.62 Tellingly, it lists the moves towards excluding CSOs from the judicial review process
as one of the measures inhibiting them from acting as advocates on behalf of their service users.63
The obstacles placed in the path of CSOs, making it more difficult for them to challenge govern-
ment policy in the political sphere, are mirrored by the restrictions in judicial review cases. This points
to a dismissive attitude towards the advocacy work of CSOs. For example, the original proposals for
the insertion of anti-lobbying clauses in government grants to CSOs were criticised for potentially
preventing CSOs entering into policy discussions in areas relevant to their work. It would have
made it more difficult for CSOs to work with ministers, local MPs and inhibited giving evidence to
select committees in the House of Commons.64 These methods are the stock-in-trade of CSOs work-
ing with government on policy that affects their areas of interests, and are also mechanisms holding
government to account. Although these proposals were amended, the final version is said to create a
‘chilling effect’ for CSOs.65 This correlates with the changes made to the judicial review process that
cause greater uncertainty by exposing CSOs to unpredictable costs.66
In sum, the various measures initiated by government represent a shift in the underlying philoso-
phy by which the executive interacts with civil society. There is less appreciation of the advocacy role
of CSOs, and for the distinctive attributes they bring to the table. This has not only impacted on the
capacity of CSOs to participate in policy making and debate, but has generated doubts about their use
of legal tactics in instigating legal proceedings, participating through third-party interventions, and
supporting those who find it necessary to engage with law.
Beyond the rule of law: CSOs and the courts
CSOs recognise the need to have sound legal claims, but they go beyond rule of law arguments to jus-
tify their activities in judicial review cases. This is evident in the responses of CSOs to the Proposals for
Further Reform consultation, which places a high value on the grounds of voice and representation
consistent with broader understandings of legal accountability. They draw on their capacity to present
their client group’s perspective to the court, their acquired knowledge and expertise and their respon-
sibility as members of civil society within a democracy to act as advocates.
By contrast, and unsurprisingly, the responses of the legal profession and CSOs with a legal focus,
such as the Public Law Project, primarily adopt a rule of law approach.67 This is consistent with nar-
rower versions of legal accountability that gives pre-eminence to the need to police the legal bound-
aries of executive power, to protect rights and to challenge illegality in the public interest.68 The Public
61R Cooney ‘“Get a backbone” during the election, Bubb urges charity leaders’ (2017) Third Sector, available at http://www.
thirdsector.co.uk/get-backbone-during-election-bubb-urges-charity-leaders/policy-and-politics/article/1434956 (last accessed
13 June 2018).
62The Panel on the Independence of the Voluntary Sector Independence under Threat: The Voluntary Sector 2013
(London: Baring Foundation, 2013); The Panel on the Independence of the Voluntary Sector Independence Undervalued:
The Voluntary Sector 2014 (London: Baring Foundation, 2014); The Panel on the Independence of the Voluntary Sector
2015, above n 59 and Civil Exchange Independence in Question: The Voluntary Sector in 2016 (London: Baring
Foundation, 2016) and Civil Exchange 2017, above n 43.
63The Panel on the Independence of the Voluntary Sector 2014, above n 62, p 29. See also Compact Voice Judicial
Review-Proposals for Further Reform: A Response by Compact Voice November 2013, available at http://www.compactvoice.
org.uk/sites/default/files/judicial_review_-_consultation_response.pdf (last accessed 13 June 2018).
64P Holbrook ‘The government has listened to us on the anti lobbying clause’ Third Sector 6 December 2016.
65See Civil Exchange 2017, above n 43, p 46.
66Civil Exchange 2017, above n 43, p 14.
67Public Law Project Public Law Project Response to Judicial Review: Proposals for Further Reform Consultation
1 November 2013, para 13, available at http://www.publiclawproject.org.uk/data/resources/147/PLP_consultation-response_
JR_further_reforms_1_11_13.pdf (last accessed 13 June 2018).
68P Cane ‘Understanding judicial review and its impact’ in M Hertogh and S Halliday (eds) Judicial Review and its
Bureaucratic Impact: International and Interdisciplinary Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) pp 15, 17.
8 Harriet Samuels
Law Project explains that the government’s proposals, to amend the rules on standing and third-party
interventions, ‘misunderstands the constitutional role of the court’.69 Their comments are repeated in
many of the other CSO responses. They insist that judicial review is not only about the vindication of
individual rights, but is also a means to prevent the abuse of power.70 Therefore interested citizens and
CSOs must have the ability to challenge government in the courts.71
The Government’s summary of the responses to the Proposals for Further Reform consultation
reports the rule of law grounds, but ignores other reasons given by CSOs for supporting the current
law on standing and third-party interventions.72 The summary acknowledges that the majority of
answers were against any change.73 It lists the reasons given, which included some government acts
becoming unchallengeable because no-one is directly affected, lack of evidence of problems with
the current law, a denial of access to justice and a weakening of the rule of law.74 The summary
did not report any answers raising the issue of voice and representation, although it mentioned
responses that claimed NGOs who made third-party interventions helped the court contextualise
public policy thus also benefiting the government.75
Conversely, a closer reading of CSOs’ responses and the materials produced by the voluntary sector,
with less of a legal mandate, reveal a different emphasis. This centres on the CSOs’ need to represent
their often vulnerable and marginalised service users and on their expertise.76 On one level, the prag-
matic benefits of group rather than individual challenges are stressed. On another level, the arguments
focus on principles that understand CSOs as having a legitimate function in representing a particular
group and providing them with a voice. The response of Sense, a charity that works with deaf and
blind people, typifies points made by other CSOs. Their reasons for engaging in judicial review are
summed up below:
We have had to intervene because people we represent are too marginalised to challenge unlawful
acts on their own behalf. In addition, there are some circumstances where an unlawful decision
will go unchecked by the fact that there is no individual or organisation that is able to establish
sufficient standing to challenge the decision.77
Sense and others go on to state that it is convenient for a CSO to bring a single case testing the law
rather than allowing multiple cases to proceed. The Public Law Project also makes this point, referring
to examples where an unlawful policy has not yet affected any individual or where a significant legal
point fails to reach the courts because the defendant ‘buys off’ claimants through settlements.78 The
69Public Law Project, above n 67.
70Ibid, para 13. See Sedley LJ in R v Somerset County Council, ex p Dixon (1998) 75 P & C R 175 at 183.
71For an extra judicial discussion see S Sedley ‘Not in the public interest’ (2014) London Review of Books 29. See contra
TRS Allan Constitutional Justice a Liberal Theory of the Rule of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) pp 195–196.
72Out of the 325 responses, 242 answered the questions on standing and interventions (questions 9–11): Ministry of Justice
2014, above n 37, p 27.
73There were 16 responses in favour of narrowing the law on standing, and 12 that gave a mixed response. The main rea-
sons in favour of a revised test were to protect local authority resources. It was also stated that allowing any person to chal-
lenge a decision of a public authority might undermine the democratic process: Ministry of Justice 2014, above n 37, p 28.
74Ministry of Justice 2014, above n 37, pp 27–28.
75Ministry of Justice 2014, above n 37, pp 27–28.
76A freedom of information request under the Freedom of Information Act 2000, for access to the responses to the con-
sultation, was rejected. The Ministry of Justice provided an excel spreadsheet summarising the individual responses to each
question in the consultation (MOJ spreadsheet 2015). Some CSOs provided copies of their responses after a specific request
from the author, and others were available on the CSO’s website or from other internet sources.
77Sense Sense Consultation Response: Judicial Review Proposals for Further Reform 2013, on file with the author.
78Public Law Project, above n 67, paras 24 and 25.
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submission from Refugee Action notes that CSOs can identify patterns of illegality and by bringing
one legal challenge the court can settle the matter.79
Further reasons for CSOs participation in judicial review employ a normative approach. This stresses
the function of CSOs in communicating the on-the-ground realities of their user groups. For instance,
the submission from Sense states that:
Charities like Sense play a critical role as the mouthpiece and representative body for those that
have lost their voice or feel that they do not have the strength to fight their own fight.80
Another submission fromWomen’s Aid, an organisation that provides a network of services to women
who have been subject to domestic violence, makes a similar point:
Women’s Aid greatly values the current judicial review system in enabling the voices of women
experiencing domestic violence to be heard in cases of public interest … any changes to the
standing for judicial reviews or costs of interveners will impact on charities representing the
most vulnerable in society and will cut off their voices from being heard.81
Sense and Women’s Aid provide cogent arguments for the participation of CSOs in the adjudicatory
process that include, but go well beyond, upholding the rule of law. The responses demonstrate that
CSOs appreciate the significance of holding government to account through the courts. However,
they also want to contribute to judicial decision making by presenting their perspective on the correct
interpretation and development of law. This shows that CSOs understand legal accountability as hav-
ing an expressive element.82 By this it is meant that law not only seeks to halt the abuse of power, but
also articulates values and principles that determine how the law is interpreted and implemented.83
CSOs enrich judicial decision-making by communicating their observations of social reality, thus
raising judges’ consciousness of how legal principles might play out on the ground.84
Justifying CSOs’ participation: contemporary perspectives
The arguments against CSOs participation in PIL are usually based on the perils of politicising the
court and jeopardising ‘disinterested justice’.85 The writing of Morton and Knopff, for instance, in
Canada has expressed the view that coalitions of interest groups have captured the judicial process
to advance their agenda through judicial activism. They argue that interest groups have achieved
legal changes using the Canadian Charter of Rights that would have been difficult to make in the
legislature.86 This is regarded as an illegitimate bypassing of democratic institutions that privilege
elite interests.87
The most obvious response is to observe that CSOs work in areas where legal disputes generate
controversy. Cases about human rights, equalities, immigration and welfare law engage with issues
that attract political interest. CSOs may well have an ongoing political agenda objecting to a policy
or practice that subsequently leads to litigation. Provided the claims are grounded in convincing
79Refugee Action Refugee Action Consultation Response: Ministry of Justice: Judicial Review-Proposals for Further Reform
November 2013, on file with the author.
80Sense, above n 77.
81Women’s Aid Women’s Aid Consultation Response: Ministry of Justice Consultation on Judicial Review: Proposals for
Further Reform October 2013, on file with the author.
82King, above n 7, p 146.
83Ibid.
84See Lady Hale’s comments on the valuable insights provided by interventions: Hale, above n 45.
85Harlow and Rawlings, above n 13, p 199.
86FL Morton and R Knopff The Charter Revolution and the Court Party (Louisville: Broadview Press, 2000) and I Brodie
Friends of the Court: The Privileging of Interest Group Litigants in Canada (New York: State University of New York Press,
2002).
87Morton and Knopff, above n 86, p 149.
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legal arguments, and abide by the relevant procedural rules, it is hard to justify preventing CSOs from
testing the public authority’s view of the law, and ensuring that genuine disputes reach the courts.
Legislation such as the HRA, and the public sector equalities duty in section 149 of the Equality
Act 2010, confers rights and duties that are legally enforceable. The fact that a legal challenge generates
publicity in a system that prides itself on open justice and debate should not of itself be a reason for
restricting a judicial review. In addition, whether or not a decision is considered judicial overreach is
often a matter of dispute, and it is difficult to show the connection between this and CSO activity.88
Those who object to the presence of CSOs tend to overstate the sharpness of the divide between law
and politics.89 They fail to account for the plasticity of public law, particularly human rights law. This
is not to suggest that the court’s discretion is unconstrained. Rather, it is to agree with Loughlin that
the courts are at the interface between law and politics and are required to interpret and apply political
ideas within the values and limits of the existing legal structures.90
CSOs’ claim to enhance the participative and representative character of judicial review proceedings
have been supported by deliberative and dignitarian theories. There has, however, been less attention
paid by lawyers to theories of civil society that champion the need to protect CSOs’ character as
autonomous institutions. CSOs are equipped with the knowledge and weight of experience to chal-
lenge public authorities, participate in public discourse and facilitate government accountability. By
connecting these three frames it is possible to make a stronger case for CSOs’ legal work in judicial
review cases.
One of the advantages of the deliberative frame is that it sees the court as one of a number of
multiple publics where ‘door openers’ are provided for excluded groups, often represented by
CSOs.91 This is borne out by the HRA, where litigation is frequently brought by electoral minorities
and other marginalised groups.92 Rather than the courts thwarting democracy and becoming a surro-
gate political process, they can shore up democracy and its principles.93 Judges, depending on their
specific powers, can ensure that executive decisions or legislation has at least taken account of the
rights and interests of those who may be sidelined by the executive or Parliament. So, for example,
courts having the powers of judicial review of legislation can make certain that legislation has taken
account of minorities or unpopular groups that are unable to gain a hearing or lack representation
in the legislature. Such groups might include prisoners, travellers, welfare recipients or immigrants.94
Others would add an additional requirement that courts review legislation and administrative deci-
sions to ensure they are taken in accordance with key principles and values, for example human rights,
and established constitutional norms.95
Courts cannot be deliberative in the manner of political and other forums. But broad rules of stand-
ing and interventions allow them to be less bipolar and permit a wider range of perspectives to be
heard when courts are shaping the law.96 This is evidenced by the contribution CSOs have made
to the development of human rights law through the number and quality of their interventions.97
88For a contemporary discussion of judicial activism see NW Barber, R Ekins and P Yowell Lord Sumption and the Limits
of Law (Oxford: Hart, 2016).
89See for example Harlow’s warnings about group litigation: C Harlow ‘Public law and popular justice’ (2002) MLR 1.
90M Loughlin Sword and Scales: An Examination of the Relationship between Law and Politics (Oxford: Hart, 2000) p 105.
91A Sathanapally Beyond Disagreement: Open Remedies in Human Rights Adjudication (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2012) p 66.
92A Kavanagh Constitutional Review under the Human Rights Act (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) p 379.
93Habermas, above n 51.
94J Ely Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1980) and for a
variation of this theory see C Sunstein Designing Democracy: What Constitutions Do (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
95Habermas, above n 51, and for a discussion in relation to human rights see S Fredman Human Rights Transformed:
Positive Rights and Positive Duties (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
96Fredman ibid, p 107.
97S Shah, T Poole and M Blackwell ‘Rights, interveners and the law lords’ (2014) 34 OJLS 295. For a critical view see
S Hannett ‘Third-party interventions: in the public interest?’ (2003) PL 128 and Harlow, above n 89. See contra M Arshi
and C O’Cinneide ‘Third-party intervention: the public interest reaffirmed’ (2004) PL 69.
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To cede the space occupied by CSOs would be to make it harder to dispute the interpretation of law
adopted by public authorities, in the exercise of their powers and duties, and leave the state less
accountable for its decision-making.
There are also compelling arguments based in dignitarian theory for enabling CSOs to participate
in PIL. For dignitarian theorists, respecting dignity means understanding people as having the auton-
omy to regulate their own actions and being able to give an account of themselves that others take
seriously.98 CSOs ensure that minority positions are heard in legal forums by bringing challenges
and intervening in decisions.99 Procedures are seen as embodying certain inherent values and are
important irrespective of the outcome. These values might include participation, fairness and the pro-
tection of dignity.100 The point is that the procedures may lead to a better outcome, but this is not their
main justification given that sound due process is seen as having an intrinsic value.101 Bondy, Platt and
Sunkin’s research provides support for this view as they found that even claimants who had lost their
judicial review claim reported they had achieved non-tangible benefits such as a sense of empower-
ment.102 CSOs’ responses in the Proposals for Further Reform consultation put forward instrumental
reasons that explained how their presence would improve the final decision.103 Yet it is implicit in
CSOs’ responses that their clients’ perspectives on the manner in which laws are being interpreted
and applied should be heard and that without their assistance this would not be possible.104
The third frame for considering the presence of CSOs connects with dignitarian and deliberative
ideas, but draws on the civil society literature. Attacks on the legitimacy of CSOs’ presence in court
proceedings make this perspective all the more pertinent. As we have seen CSOs view their function
in the courtroom as conveying the everyday realities of their constituent groups to the court. But their
participation is also a real and symbolic means of respecting the autonomy and independence of CSOs
to decide how to pursue their objectives, even if this conflicts with the government’s view of their
functions or policy. The response of Detention Action makes this point:
Public interest litigation is a vital means for civil society to challenge abusive behaviour by gov-
ernment and public bodies. It is generally recognised that a healthy democracy requires an active
civil society with a stake in defining the public interest. All governments risk confusing their own
interests with the public interest; this is why scope for scrutiny and challenge is so essential.105
Here what is being stressed is the propriety of CSOs’ action as part of an active civil society that is
entitled to enter public forums, including legal arenas, to speak out for their client group, and
where necessary to challenge government.
CSOs’ presence in judicial review claims also carries weight because they are repositories of knowl-
edge and experience. It is the expertise of the CSO itself as well as its function of representing others
that is accentuated.106 CSOs regard themselves as not simply institutions that channel information
from the ground, but as having an accumulated knowledge through their own work. They have a
98J Waldron ‘How law protects dignity’ (2012) CLJ 200 at 201.
99See P Bryden ‘Public interest intervention in the courts’ (1987) Canadian Bar Review 509.
100G Richardson ‘The legal regulation of process’ in G Richardson and H Genn (eds) Administrative Law and Government
Action: The Courts and Alternative Mechanisms of Review (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) p 115.
101Richardson, ibid, p 128. For a more sceptical view see DJ Gallighan Due Process and Fair Procedures: A Study of
Administrative Procedures (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) p 76 and Harlow and Rawlings Law and
Administration (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) p 620.
102See Bondy, Platt and Sunkin, above n 47, p 37.
103See for example Mind’s submission reproduced in Mind Legal Unit ‘Judicial review: proposals for further reform’ (2013)
Newsletter 8–12.
104See the response of Women’s Aid above n 81 and Sense above n 77 to the Proposals for Further Reform Consultation.
105Ministry of Justice Spreadsheet 2015, above n 76.
106Cane notes that the courts will grant what he calls associational standing where the CSO represents an identifiable group
to whom it is accountable. It will grant public interest standing where the CSO claims to represent the public interest in their
area of expertise. See Cane, above n 32.
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distinctive voice that is not part of the market or the state. This is recognised by the Compact between
government and CSOs which, although diminished in status, remains in force, and includes a
commitment by government to consult and to work with CSOs that represent or provide services
to under-represented and disadvantaged groups.107 The courts also value the competency, respectabil-
ity and proficiency of CSOs and consider these factors when deciding whether the CSO has a ‘suffi-
cient interest’ or should be allowed to intervene.108 From this perspective there is a need for the law to
understand and approve of CSOs as having a special position not just because they can describe the
experience of others, but because they are autonomous groups who process empirical knowledge and
therefore deserve a hearing.
The involvement of CSOs in judicial review claims also represents an appreciation of the function
of CSOs in upholding human rights. CSOs, usually referred to as NGOs, in this context have a history
of educating on human rights, standard setting, fact finding and enforcing human rights through the
use of judicial and quasi-judicial bodies.109 CSOs operationalise human rights values through their
work by using human rights to progress their aims and hold public authorities to human rights stan-
dards.110 This may be by intervening in HRA cases, and supporting individual claimants. It is also
done through promoting the use of international human rights instruments and other legislation
such as equality laws.111 This has been the case with groups that have been involved in service provi-
sion and who work in fields involving social and economic rights. Many, but not all, of the cases
involving the austerity policy used rights-based arguments to advance their claims.112 The criticisms
of the HRA in certain sections of the media and government have led to a readiness to undermine the
autonomy of CSOs, restricting their access to legal as well as political forums.113 This closes off ave-
nues for the redress of grievances that may have enduring consequences affecting the ability of CSOS
to help safeguard the rights and interests of different communities.
Supporting CSOs’ work is not to overly romanticise their role or to fail to acknowledge the issues of
governance, exemplified by the collapse of Kids Company.114 It is not to ignore the broader concerns
that sometimes arise regarding the disconnect between CSOs and their grassroots when they become
closer to government and more professional and managerial in outlook.115 These are issues that
require CSOs’ continual attention. However, there is still evidence that CSOs’ experiential knowledge
and attachment to particular communities gives them a certain credibility, which has been taken
seriously by all governments. It is one of the reasons successive governments have wanted to work
with CSOs and have, to varying degrees, drawn them into formal partnerships.
In short, versions of civil society that perceive its task as going beyond volunteering and good
works, to verbalise the concerns of its clients, fit with the aims of deliberative and dignitarian theories.
CSOs facilitate access, articulate the perspective of their client group and offer their own expertise and
understanding to the courts.
107The Compact 2010, above n 1, para 5.1.
108See R v Inspectorate of Pollution, ex p Greenpeace Ltd (No 2), above n 32, and R v Secretary of State for the Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs, ex p World Development Movement Ltd [1995] 1 WLR 386. See Cane, above n 32.
109P Alston and R Goodman International Human Rights: The Successor to International Human Rights in Context
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) pp 1503–1504.
110S Calnan The Effectiveness of Domestic Human Rights NGOs: A Comparative Study (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2008).
111See Lady Hale on the role of interveners in drawing the court’s attention to international human rights jurisprudence:
Hale, above n 45, at 107.
112See for example the reliance on Art 1 Protocol 1 and Art 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights and the
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child in R (on the application of SG and Others) (previously JS and Others) v
Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2015] UKSC 16, above n 25.
113On the hostility to human rights see S Marks ‘Backlash: the undeclared war against human rights’ (2014) 4 EHRLR 319.
114J Coleman ‘Kids company and beyond’ (2015) Solicitors Journal 3.
115See Rochester, above n 54. See also A Choudry and D Kapoor (eds) NGOization: Complicity, Contradictions and
Prospects (London: Zed Books, 2013).
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Conclusion
The concern about CSOs’ use of judicial review is better understood as a general scepticism of their
advocacy work. It has been seen as a mission drift away from the more traditional CSO activities of
community and philanthropic works. This context prompts greater scrutiny of the claim that CSOs are
abusing the judicial review process for cheap publicity, or to deliberately thwart government policy.
The CSOs’ response to the Proposals for Further Reform consultation demonstrate both pragmatic
and normative justifications for their presence in judicial review cases that include, but go beyond,
the rule of law reasons of questioning the abuse of power. CSOs’ presence in judicial review claims
is supported by deliberative and dignitarian theories that seek to explain the value of participation
and refute arguments that PIL is anti-democratic.
CSOs are needed to assist claimants navigate the channels left open by the law, and to bring claims
in the public interest. To operate effectively they must be able to exercise their judgement independ-
ently, and should not be unduly hampered by procedural rules designed to deter their presence in judi-
cial review cases. Reflecting on civil society’s function provides insights into its distinctive features and
capacities. In the course of heated political debates on austerity, welfare and other issues it is easy for
political and legal actors to lose sight of the significance of the structures and processes that support
CSOs. Weakening these structures and CSOs’ autonomy will have long-term consequences, making it
more difficult to hold government to account through the courts and shutting out voices that need to
be heard.
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